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ABSTRACT
The future of continental cooperation within North America remains uncertain.
However, if the three principal countries of this continent intend to deepen the
ties that have brought them together under the NorthAmerican Free TradeAgree-
ment, they will need to navigate the process of further international accords, both
in terms of treaties and negotiated changes to domestic laws. An important but
overlooked feature of this process is the fact that each of the three countries has a
federal system different from that of the others in terms of relative overall institu-
tional strength and degrees of centralization and decentralization. Like the
European Union (particularly in relation to the German federal system and the
principle of subsidiarity), the North American countries will need to take federal-
ism into account when negotiating and implementing any future legal agreements
and institutions among themselves. A strongly centralized federal system with a
weak institutional presence can facilitate the negotiation and imposition of new
legal arrangements that will provide for further economic and political coopera-
tion. However, a more strongly decentralized system with a strong overall insti-
tutional presence (resembling the Canadian model) could potentially provide the
impetus for more effective implementation of these legal agreements as well as
foster a greater sense of acceptance and involvement in a broader NorthAmerican
community among regions and local communities.
Key words: federalism, constitutional law, subsidiarity, comparative politics, North American
legal cooperation
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INTRODUCTION
Aparticularly understudied aspect of the continental integration of North America
has been the subject of federalism. The legal consequences of this system of shared
sovereignty in relation to the NorthAmerica Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA), evolving
treaty relationships, other commercial agreements, and the overall goal of greater
continental legal harmonization are, potentially, much more profound than most
observers might perceive. It is imperative that the effect of the very different fed-
eral systems of Canada, Mexico, and the United States on their relationship within
North America be better understood. Otherwise, those differences and the very con-
cept of shared sovereignty that is an integral part of the political systems of these
three countries could hinder or even undermine that continental legal, political, and
economic development. This relationship has not been addressed in these precise
terms but the general theme of North American integration and the effect of feder-
alism on it have been addressed in other, related areas (O’Brien, 1995: 693-724).
It is important to consider, therefore, whether a particular federal system will be
conducive to the process of future legal cooperation (including in terms of the intro-
duction of any supra-national legal institutions) within North America. These three
federal systems of North America differ from each other. Whether or not those dif-
ferences might matter in the broader scheme of reconciling and harmonizing the
laws and legal systems of Canada, Mexico, and the United States under future treaties
or other agreements depends upon gaining a meaningful appreciation of the effect
that federalism and its shared sovereignty might have on that process.
So, first, each federal system needs to be examined within a comparative context.
Then, the significance of the comparisons and contrasts should be considered in
terms of any practical effect they might have upon negotiation and implementation
of any future legal agreements and institutions that will be required for continental
cooperation to advance, especially in terms of enhanced legal harmonization and in-
tegration. The degree to which these countries’ central governments are able to nego-
tiate and impose a NorthAmerican system upon their respective states or provinces
is determined by these characteristics, while the capacity to implement and sustain
them at the regional and local levels also is subject to these fundamental conditions.
The primary distinctions among these three federal systems may be identified
in terms of two broad, yet distinct, characterizations: 1) the relative institutional and
political strength of the federal system itself; 2) the relative degree of centralization
or decentralization of sovereign authority within the federal system. A strongly
centralized federal system (such Mexico’s and the United States’) can facilitate the
negotiation and imposition of new legal arrangements that will provide for further
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economic and political cooperation. However, a more strongly decentralized sys-
tem (such as Canada’s) could potentially provide the impetus for more effective
implementation of these legal agreements as well as foster a greater sense of accept-
ance and involvement in a broader NorthAmerican community among regions and
local communities. Furthermore, constitutionally stronger and better defined federal
institutions overall (such as are found within Canada and the United States) could
also facilitate long-term legal implementation, though they could frustrate negotia-
tions at the same time.
THE NORMS AND PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM
MOST RELEVANT TO LEGAL COOPERATION
This article will, first, identify the theoretical norms and principles of federalism
that are most relevant to advancing legal cooperation. Then, it will examine each of
the three federal systems in terms of these central characteristics. The next section
will use the two most pivotal federal characteristics of institutional strength and
degree of centralization to evaluate the relative effect of each federal system on the
process of negotiation and implementation of future legal agreements, including a
comparison with the practices that have been adopted in this respect by the Euro-
pean Union (and especially in relation to the federal system of Germany), particularly
the concept of “subsidiarity.” Finally, it will offer a brief assessment of the potential
for success in this area. Ultimately, the article will conclude that federalism could
actually enhance the process of legal harmonization and integration within North
America, even though it also could create certain institutional hurdles that would
need to be negotiated along the way.
This analysis is therefore influenced by neo-institutional considerations that affect
rational choice decisions (Scheurer, 2008: 1-10). The relative institutional strength of
federalism affects the creation and performance of other legal institutions designed
to advance continental cooperation. An underlying assumption of rational choice
preferences in terms of each country’s relatively easy adoption of negotiated settle-
ments in this area can be offset by fears and resentment of participants at the region-
al and state levels. Concerns about sovereignty and sovereign status are assumed
within that analysis and reflect larger concerns about sovereign authority that have
been raised in relation to the overall status of each country that has participated in
this process and will negotiate potential future changes to their relationship in this
respect. That has been an overriding theme, especially regarding concerns and chal-
lenges to increased North American cooperation (Clarkson, 2008: 26-42).
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The status of federalism within each of these countries is, indeed, a reflection of
the underlying political conditions that have shaped them. It is therefore curious
that so little attention has been devoted to the subject of federalism as it relates to
NAFTA and the further evolution of a North American union, although there have
been occasional exceptions that have considered the challenge posed to local and
regional authority within international trade agreements as they relate to federal
systems (Weiler, 1994: 113-133). Federalism may be a single concept but its relation-
ship to each of the constituent members of NAFTA is significantly different. Therefore,
a legal and political overview of the status of federalism within Canada, Mexico,
and the United States (particularly in relation to the process of political approval and
implementation of future legal agreements among these principal North American
countries) is necessary before this effect can be reduced to the analytical character-
izations that have been proposed in this respect.
It is very important at the outset to place this discussion within a firm theoreti-
cal context. Federalism is a system of shared sovereignty and not merely a system
of delegated authority. Especially for the purpose of this analysis, it is important to
identify those features deemed essential for establishing an institutionally true and
viable federal system of shared sovereignty within a permanent union. The unifying
theme of these features is the capacity of the subunits of a federal system to exer-
cise meaningful –rather than merely nominal– sovereign powers. A true federalism
divides power into meaningful realms of sovereign control. It creates an indestruc-
tible identity of sovereign subunits that enjoy significant powers. However, the
extent of those powers is not the same for every federal system. Nonetheless, these
conditions are essential for a true federalism to exist (Duchacek, 1970: 234-244; Elazar,
1987: 166-168; Wheare, 1963: 15-32).
It has been argued that the emphasis on the constituent subunits of a federal sys-
tem is critical to its economic –as well as its political– success because it emphasizes
its core principles and advantages, especially within the context of democratic gov-
ernment. These principles include the cooperation and competition of dual sources
of jurisdiction that promote innovation and options in public policy. That same prin-
ciple of cooperation and competition lies at the core of the sort of regional union
that is gradually being sought within NorthAmerica. That sort of relationship among
sovereign partners gives its inhabitants options for supporting variations on public
policy. To succeed, all partners within this sort of arrangement must possess sovereign
authority over the areas of governmental responsibility that particularly matter to
public policy, including fiscal and social policy –an understanding of federalism
that is essential to “Tiebout model” of the conditions under which local markets are
created and sustained (Tiebout, 1956: 416-424; Qian and Weingast, 1997: 83-92).
Ameaningful form of “checks and balances” among the different levels of sov-
ereign government is also vitally important to the sustenance of a genuine federal
system.Again, it requires that the subunits possess not only sovereign authority but
authority that relates tomeaningful dimensions of public policy. Therefore, some form
of mutual influence over key features of the economic, political, legal, and social life
of a country (which can include a division between the initiation and implementa-
tion of policies) must be shared for a federal system to be authentic in its purpose and
performance. Without that sort of coordination and cooperation, the system lacks
coherence as a whole (Elazar, 1967: 14-27; Sundquist, 1969: 13-31, 246-278).
Agreater perception of political accountability to the electorate occurs whenmean-
ingful units of government are more locally positioned. Distrust of distant centers
of government can be alleviated through shared sovereignty associated with more
familiar authority that is more reflective of a local or regional population. However,
the subunit must possess and exercise truly sovereign authority regarding truly
meaningful areas of policy and governance. Otherwise, a sense of autonomy among
members of that electorate will remain elusive and an attitude of support (and, per-
haps, a sense of legitimacy) toward the overarching government will be denied
(Rondinelli, McCullough, and Johnson, 1989: 57-87).
True federalism is intended to advance greater efficiency in government and
administration through specialization of the different levels of government, creating
a sense of diverse competencies. Again, a meaningful division of genuinely sovereign
authority must be enacted in order for this benefit to be achieved. Furthermore,
specialization can lead to greater competence in governmental functions, thus rein-
forcing public support for all levels of government within a federal system (Shah,
2006: 1-40; Garman, Haggard, and Willis, 2000: 205-236).
The predominance of the “top-down” model of federalism could be a problem
for achieving this sort of effective federal system. The imposition of a central vision
of a country, like the imposition of a regional vision by a single, dominant interna-
tional state, can undermine the entire purpose of such a venture, let alone its popular
support and practical efficacy. Federalism has tended to work best as the result of
sovereign states uniting and agreeing to delegate, permanently, some of their sov-
ereign authority to a central government. A system that is dominated from the “top”
can result in an erosion of the effective –if not the actual– sovereign scope of the
subunits and, thus, of the very purpose of having a federal system (Williams and
Tarr, 2004: 3-24).
These criteria are not the only important features of an effective federal system.
However, they do reflect principles that are particularly relevant to the mainte-
nance of an effective union, especially among diverse subunits. Therefore, they also
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offer a potentially interesting comparison with the process of creating internation-
al institutions of regional cooperation and integration. Furthermore, among federal
countries, the conditions for achieving that sort of integration (including legal inte-
gration) can be particularly affected by the adherence of the respective federal
countries to these particular principles (Lejeune, 2003: 97-114).
In one sense, legal harmonization and integration can be achieved much more
easily among countries with unitary systems of sovereign authority. But in another
sense, countries with true and effective federal systems can compel the sort of coop-
eration and collaboration at the subunit level that can make the overall process of
legal harmonization and integration more thorough, more specifically relevant, more
thoughtful, and more effective within a diverse legal, political, and economic envi-
ronment than a centrally-imposed vision might otherwise produce. Therefore, an
evaluation of the three principal countries of North America and the status of their
respective federal systems in this respect might provide insights regarding the
potential underlying course of the process of legal harmonization and integration
for this region.
CANADIAN FEDERALISM
Federalism has been identified as one of the defining features of the Canadian con-
stitutional system and its political history. The union that created the Dominion of
Canada in 1867 was based on antecedents that had attempted to consolidate in dif-
ferent ways the diverse colonies that comprised British North America. In that res-
pect, the greatest challenge had been the attempt to reconcile the descendants of New
France who had persisted in retaining their separate identity, which was a source of
concern for British imperial authorities in connection with the threat of rebellion
among the American colonies to the south. The British Parliament passed the Que-
bec Act of 1774, which affirmed the distinct legal, religious, and political identity of
this part of British North America. It also established the basis for the ongoing
attempt to reconcile distinct identities within this broader colony that would persist as
self-government and, eventually, complete independence was pursued for Canada.
This process would revolve around the two most dominant entities within British
North America that by the nineteenth century would be known as Upper Canada
(which would evolve into the province of Ontario) and Lower Canada (which would
evolve into the province of Quebec), but the principle it established would be
extended to all the component parts of this vast continental possession (Wagenberg,
Soderlund, Nelson, and Briggs, 1990: 7-39; Stevenson, 1979: 27-32).
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Indeed, the attempt to combine these two distinct entities (although the admin-
istrative division of Canada West and Canada East would be retained) into a united
Province of Canada (as recommended by the Durham Report, created in response
to rebellions in both the colonies in 1838) demonstrated the need to accommodate
these separate cultural and political identities in order for any sort of self-govern-
ment to be successful. The foundation of Canadian federalism was established as a
result of that recognition, particularly regarding the demands of Quebec and fran-
cophone subjects (Stevenson, 1993: 3-22). The necessary compromise that emerged
from the debates over the British North America Act (now the Constitution Act of
1867) produced an arrangement (mythologized as the “compact theory of Confedera-
tion) that gave the provinces considerable advantages, though the relative strength
of the provincial level would not be apparent until after favorable judicial rulings
(especially from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, acting in London as a
court of final appeal) reinforced them, especially in terms of provincial authority
over resources, civil law, and property (Scott, F. R., 1989: 60-70).
One of the keys to understanding the federal relationship within Canada is sec-
tion 92 of the Constitution Act of 1867. Among the sovereign powers that it delegated
to the provincial level was authority over resources. The significance of that arrange-
ment would not be fully appreciated for decades, but its significance in terms of
providing greater economic strength for provincial governments in their relation-
ships with the central government would be, arguably, the single most significant
factor in shifting the balance of federal relationships in a more decentralized direc-
tion. Nonetheless, other powers of the provincial governments in the area of civil law,
property rights, and administrative responsibility regarding criminal law and other
matters of general enforcement, regardless of jurisdiction, assisted this tendency
(Hogg, 1992: 108-112).
Historically, during its initial phase of the mid-to-late nineteenth century, the
federal system within Canada was highly centralized. This trend was the result of
early Canadian administrations’ relative strength in asserting their dominance over
political and economicmatters, as well as the tendency of the judicial system to uphold
federal claims to this preeminence in matters involving disputes of jurisdictional
authority. Furthermore, the federal government exercised powers of disallowance
on behalf of the imperial Parliament, frequently claiming that legislation and actions
of provincial governments violated imperial prerogatives but, in reality, increasing
its own scope of initiative. The fact that the British North American Act appeared to
grant reserve powers to the federal government (symbolized by the “Peace, Order,
and Good Government” clause of section 91), rather than the provincial govern-
ments, reinforced this initial interpretation, though it was undermined by later judi-
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cial rulings. It was, most likely, consistent with the desire of British officials to pro-
mote and maintain imperial cohesion within this part of the empire, which had been,
after all, the prime motive for confederation from the perspective of the British gov-
ernment (Vaughan, 1986: 495-519; Lower, 1958: 35-36).
However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the trend toward greater decen-
tralization of the Canadian federal system had begun. In particular, constitutional
rulings on federal power were increasingly appealed to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in London, which served as the final authority on such matters
and which overwhelmingly interpreted the British North America Act in a manner
that favored the sovereign claims of the provinces. During this same period, federal
governments tended to abandon recourse to claims of reserve powers and disal-
lowance, partly in recognition of these rulings and, also, as a reflection of the grow-
ing assertion of de facto Canadian legal and political authority, which made claims
on behalf of the imperial government less and less politically acceptable. As a result,
provincial government increased their legal and political activities, especially regard-
ing administrative oversight, local economic policy, and defining the scope of prop-
erty and other civil rights (Russell, 2004: 34-52).
The federal government in Canada was able to reassert its dominance as a result
of the two World Wars and recourse to the War Measures Act of 1914 and the estab-
lishment of a federal income tax –measures that were generally accepted as neces-
sary under the circumstances. During World War II, in particular, practical federal
jurisdiction was extended to various social services, including unemployment insur-
ance (Cody, 1977: 66-68). Nonetheless, by the end of the war, overall cooperation
between the two sovereign levels had increased, mainly as a result of the expansion
of the welfare state and the need for this sort of collaboration in order to implement
these policies (Corry, 1958: 106-110). During the 1950s, this cooperation was insti-
tutionalized through the adoption of First Ministers’ Meetings, in which formal and
informal arrangements in this area were reached, though with inconsistent and, at
times, diminishing success (Cairns, 1977: 696-699).
However, the constitutional authority of the provinces over the administration
of justice was exercised in other bureaucratic areas, particularly regarding the vast
scope of public policy and government services. Increasingly, provincial governments
began to pursue their own public policies in this area, particularly after following
Quebec’s lead during its “Quiet Revolution” of the 1960s, which found its govern-
ment expanding the role of the state in its people’s daily lives (Dion, 1993: II, 247-
312). Federal efforts to resume the public policy initiative through increased welfare
programs, economic coordination, and overall centralized administration came into
conflict with this trend, as is particularly evident in the implementation of a National
Energy Policy over the objections of Alberta and its petroleum interests.1 Agitation
within Quebec for political separation from the rest of the country increased these
tensions, especially as the federal government under Pierre Trudeau sought to advance
a plan of greater national unity to overcome the strains imposed by linguistic, ethnic,
and –to a lesser extent– regional diversity.
In addition to the Official Languages Act and other efforts to advance the goal
of a bilingual and multicultural Canada, Trudeau wanted to patriate the Constitu-
tion with the addition of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. But that move was gen-
erally interpreted by the provincial governments as a potential step toward increased
centralization of federal sovereign authority, especially after the federal government
attempted to effect those constitutional changes (after attempts at agreement with
the provinces had initially faltered) and impose a unilateral solution. The ultimate
result was a compromise on both the scope of the Charter and the amending formula
that would reinforce the federal system and the strong role of the provinces within
it. That compromise remains in effect, despite unsuccessful attempts to alter the re-
lationship (especially at the level of formal interstate relations between the provinces
and the federal government) such as the failed Meech Lake Accord. The ultimate
result has been a federal system in which intergovernmental cooperation, including
in terms of ongoing institutional relationships (most conspicuously represented by
First Ministers meetings among the various federal and provincial chief executives),
is a necessary element of fundamental political and economic initiatives that affect
the country as a whole, though much of that interaction occurs within the central
government. This “intrastate” activity of making institutions within the federal gov-
ernment responsive to provincial concerns and goals can both facilitate and frustrate
the legal process at the national level, including in terms of implementing the laws
mandated by international agreements (Smiley and Watts, 1985: 29-33, 155-157).
MEXICAN FEDERALISM
Mexico’s federal development has been markedly different from that of its continen-
tal neighbors, both in terms of origins and ultimate purpose. As a result, at times, its
status has been perplexing. The reason for accepting a sovereign division within
Mexico when its independence was first established is itself subject to dispute. Some
authorities have claimed that it was a result of previously existing territorial and
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1 The concept of “shared powers” in this context generally referred only to powers that fell under the sov-
ereign jurisdiction of the federal government, as the provinces became increasingly jealous of their own
sovereign prerogatives (Leslie, 1987: 80-85).
cultural divisions in Mexico during the colonial period that needed to be recognized
to protect the new nation from the tyrannical tendencies of centralization characteris-
tic of imperial rule. However, other authorities have claimed that setting up a federal
system was a contradictory act that belied the true nature of the new country’s politi-
cal system and establishment and may, in fact, have served to facilitate this consol-
idation, especially among large landowners (particularly hacienda owners) and other
powerful Mexican elites (Acosta Romero, 1982: 399-404).
The 1824 Mexican Constitution did not appear to have established a particular-
ly effective federal system, at least in terms of the sovereign interests of the various
states. If the argument that Mexico was essentially “forged” from various provinces
and other local territories (Anna, 1998: 1-4) is accepted, federalism was initially nec-
essary for achieving political cohesion, especially in reaction to the previous expe-
rience of central imperial absolutism under Spain. It is uncertain whether the federal
scheme was inspired by the U.S. example or derived from that former experience.
Likewise, it is uncertain whether this federal system emerged from a strong sense
of commitment to a federal principle or as a political expedient for addressing the
initial problems of ethnic and regional diversity threatening the new country’s cohe-
sion (Anna, 1998: 1-4, 24, 30-31).
Certain features of Mexico’s early federal development appear to indicate ambi-
guity regarding the commitment to that principle. Perhaps the most notable feature
in that respect was the absence of a bicameral legislature including a chamber ded-
icated to representing the federal principle. Although Canada’s legislative upper
house, the Senate, technically was designed to represent regional rather than provin-
cial interests –and it was quickly relegated to a secondary and relatively powerless
governmental role– the initial constitutional commitment remains symbolically
important and its emphasis within the 1824 Mexican Constitution may be telling
(Anna, 1998: 161-165; Suchlicki, 1996: 63, 67). The elimination of the Senate in the
1857 Mexican Constitution, especially under the influence of President Benito Juárez,
who disparaged it as a “conspiratorial chamber,” could be regarded as further under-
mining the overall constitutional commitment to the development of Mexican fed-
eralism, even though that chamber was restored in 1871 (Suchlicki, 1996: 82-84).
Of course, the institutional grounding of federalism within central institutions
is only one way in which a constitutional commitment can be demonstrated. Amore
profound indication may be related to the status of the states. The concept of fed-
eralism emphasizes both sharing sovereignty and the permanence of that shared
sovereignty and, thus, of the federal system in general. Subunit states within a true,
strong federal system are regarded, therefore, as permanent entities that cannot be
altered without their consent (Wheare, 1963: 6). However, of the 22 original Mexican
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states, some were geographically altered (to create new states, such as in the 1849
unilateral creation of the state of Guerrero and the breakup, by presidential decree,
of Yucatan and the subsequent creation of the territory of Quintana Roo in 1902) or
eliminated without clear adherence to the federal principle, ultimately resulting in
today’s 31 states, a development that was particularly intense during the Porfirio
Díaz administration (Scott, 1964: 102-103; Bernstein, 1967: I, 389-394). Although there
was a similar transition involving the territory of many of the original U.S. states,
the changes reflected the sovereign consent of those states in a manner that in many
instances was not reflected by their Mexican counterparts. These changes also reflect
the turbulence of Mexico’s nineteenth-century history (including the brief imperial
periods) that undermined constitutional continuity in general and core principles
such as federalism in particular.
The Revolution of 1910 reestablished the federal principle in the 1917 Consti-
tution. However, the results of that revolution and constitutional establishment also
reaffirmed the historical tendency toward strong executive and centralized govern-
ment, both of which tend to undermine federalism’s effectiveness. It has been sug-
gested that the popular association of federalismwith democracy amongmuch of the
Mexican population made including the federal system necessary, even if only in a
symbolic sense. A lack of constitutional rigor for that federal system as a system of
true shared sovereignty appears to have been undermined, though, by specific con-
stitutional clauses and political conditions (Bailey, 1994: 97-119).
Articles 40 and 41 of the Constitution of 1917 do establish, though somewhat
vaguely, the federal principle. Both articles assert the general governmental expres-
sion of sovereign authority at the national and state levels. While establishing those
principles in theory, there is no indication of the actual extent of shared sovereignty.
Article 39, referring to the foundation of national sovereignty resting in “the people,”
could contribute to that ambiguity, given the president’s central, pervasive relation-
ship to the national electorate as a whole. That role as the only government official
subject to a national constituency of all the people could be reinforced by the article’s
broad language and, subsequently, influence the practical constitutional interpreta-
tion of the two articles following it (McHugh, 2002: 175-192).
Article 115 specifies the characteristics that state governments are required to
have withinMexico. That article appears to resemble the “guaranty clause” (article IV,
clause 4) of the United States Constitution, which broadly mandates state Consti-
tutions and requires that they provide “a republican form of government.”Article 124,
like the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, serves as a “reserve clause,”
mandating that powers not expressly delegated to the federal government should
be reserved to the state governments. These parallels between the Mexican and U.S.
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constitutional systems suggest a federal system for Mexico that is, de jure, rigorous in
its delegation of sovereign authority to the state level (Acosta Romero, 1982: 399-404).
But the constitutional powers specifically delegated to the Mexican federal gov-
ernment are considerable. They include the authority over the country’s labor law
and policy and social security infrastructure as established in article 123 of the
Mexican Constitution. Article 27 vests the control of natural resources and author-
ity over property rights and the distribution and regulation of electricity in the cen-
tral government. Even more significantly, article 73, section 30 (which authorizes
the federal government to enact laws necessary for fulfilling its constitutional powers)
and article 133 (which directs state courts to follow federal law when it conflicts with
state law) has been broadly interpreted and practiced in a manner that has caused
the state judicial system to be effectively subordinate to the federal judiciary. These
provisions do not merely strengthen the federal government’s political power in its
relations with the states; they also represent a fundamental structural advantage for
the sovereign authority at the center that challenges and, arguably, undermines the
federal system’s efficacy as an arrangement of a truly shared sovereignty (Acosta
Romero, 1982: 399-404).2
Another constitutional feature that challenges the structural viability of the Mex-
ican federal system is the amending formula. The provisions of article 135 are less
stringent than many other federal systems provide, despite establishing a process
that has been described as creating a formula that is formally “rigid” because it can-
not be amended by simple legislation. This article requires the approval of only a ma-
jority of the states (regardless of population), in addition to a two-thirds approval of
both chambers of the federal Congress, to ratify a change to the Constitution, including
in terms of the delegation of sovereign authority. It remains a formula that is validly
federal, but requires consensus among various sovereign units that other federal
systems generally seek to demonstrate, if not actually produce (Smith, 1993: 94-97).
Perhaps, the most significant historical feature of Mexico’s evolution as a federal
system has been that its strong political executive has de facto consistently under-
mined the federal system’s actual functioning during most of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. That tradition of strong centralization, coupled with the one-party
domination of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) until the late 1990s, exac-
erbated the Mexican federal system’s institutional shortcomings. Those combined
institutional weaknesses and political dominance hampered the system’s constitu-
tional effectiveness, often creating the impression –if not the reality– of a de jure fed-
eral system that operated as a de facto unitary system (Weingast, 2003: 28-33).
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2 An analysis of the practical consequences of this constitutional arrangement is provided in Homant, 1997:
233-274. This aspect of federalism is addressed in McHugh, 2003: 105-112.
However, the defeat of the PRI and the rise of a competitive party system in
Mexico also have spurred a reexamination of federalism. President Ernesto Zedillo,
building on tentative constitutional reforms intended to delegate greater responsi-
bility for basic services to municipal governments, promoted the concept of a “new
federalism” that would decentralize the balance of power within the system. One
result was the National Political Agreement for the Reform of the State, which pro-
duced constitutional revisions of articles 105 and 116, especially concerning electoral
reform (Fernández del Castillo, 1997: 10-12). State governors have convened to dis-
cuss and negotiate terms upon which this restructuring of the federal system may be
effected, especially in response to the economic opportunities of NAFTA (Merchant
and Rich, 2003: 661-667). Other attempts have been made in favor of decentralization,
both for economic and political reasons (Borja Tamayo, 2001: 67-90). However, that pro-
cess remains at a relatively early stage, although the idea of a “resurrection” of Mex-
ican federalism has been addressed as a positive trend of the 1990s that may eventually
be persistent, especially within a continental context (Rich, 2004: 1, 329-331, 334).
U.S. FEDERALISM
Federalism was not only the central issue that dominated the creation of the United
States, but shortcomings in resolving the precise nature and parameters of that fed-
eral union were responsible for the sectarian strife that eventually resulted in the
American Civil War. The abandonment of the unworkable confederal system created
as an expedient during the American Revolution led to negotiations regarding the
degree to which the 13 sovereign American states would agree to delegate part of
their sovereign powers to a central government. In addition to the new federal
government’s limited powers, the contentious issue of representation needed to be
addressed, resulting in the compromise of a bicameral federal legislature in which
the upper house would consist of senators selected by, and intended to be repre-
sentative of, their respective state governments (Sutton, 2002: 9-34).
Three distinct phases of U.S. federal development have been commonly identi-
fied among scholars: “dual,” cooperative, and the “new” federalism. The first phase
reflected the initially decentralized intent of U.S. federalism. Given the fundamen-
tal economic differences between the northern and southern states (which includ-
ed the uneasy compromise that permitted the continuation of slavery in the South),
the scope of federal powers were deliberately kept limited. Nonetheless, due to the
implications of the “interstate commerce clause” in article one, section eight of the
United States Constitution, the federal government’s involvement gradually began
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to expand into the economic affairs of the various states, even as the scope of federal
civil rights remained narrow, particularly because the very definition of national cit-
izenship had been reserved to the states on the basis of the “reserve powers” guar-
anteed by the Constitution’s TenthAmendment (Rosenthal and Hoefler, 1989: 1-23).
Sectarian tensions (especially regarding economic conflicts between the agrarian
South and the more industrialized North as symbolized by the moral conflict re-
garding slavery) resulted in the secession of southern states and the resultant Amer-
ican Civil War. These states claimed the authority to reclaim their full sovereignty
(consistent with the principles of a confederal –rather than federal– system) and de-
clared the creation of the Confederate States of America. That argument was resolved
by force of arms in favor of the federal forces of the North, which imposed upon the
reunited nation three constitutional amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth) that further centralized the federal system by ending the institution of
slavery throughout the country, creating a national definition of citizenship, and guar-
anteeing the voting rights of the newly enfranchised citizens –a traditional inter-
pretation that has been widely accepted in U.S. political textbooks, though it has also
been challenged as being a little too simple in its overall analysis (Elazar, 1971: 39-58).
These constitutional changes provided part of the institutional foundation that
presaged the second phase in the development of U.S. federalism. This phase rep-
resented the evolution of institutional centralization within the U.S. federal system.
Increased intervention in the economy at both the state and federal levels (including
in terms of regulations regarding public health, safety, and welfare) gradually over-
came judicial objections and greatly expanded the scope and role of the government.
The SixteenthAmendment, in clarifying the federal government’s authority to impose
an income tax, tremendously facilitated its capacity to generate revenue. The result
was a greatly increased federal government role in all aspects of the national econ-
omy (especially as the judicially-sanctioned constitutional definition of “interstate
commerce” expanded) and the creation of extensive federal programs in the areas
of education, social security, public welfare, emergency assistance, financial regula-
tion, and other fundamental economic and social activities. Increasingly, the federal
government found itself in a position to work in partnership with state govern-
ments in overseeing economic and social policy at the state and local levels, eventually
directing and even dictating these efforts. This evolution culminated in the programs
of the New Deal and the firm establishment of a social democratic state that pivoted
upon the federal government. State governments maintained their sovereign author-
ity to enact laws in these areas but the motivation and content relating to this state
legislation was increasingly dictated by the federal government’s overwhelming
fiscal dominance (Zimmerman, 1992: 102-134).
The third phase of U.S. federalism reflects ongoing –though sporadic– efforts
(beginning with the administration of Richard M. Nixon and gaining particular
emphasis during Ronald Reagan’s) at achieving greater administrative decentral-
ization within the U.S. federal system. The establishment of “block grants,” in which
federal revenues are provided to state governments, which implement their own
responses to broad federal policy initiatives, has been one of the most conspicuous
manifestations of this phase of U.S. federalism. The welfare reforms of the 1990s (in
which states were free to develop experimental approaches to this policy within broad
parameters established through federal funding assistance) offer a good example of
this trend (Conlan, 1998: 19-35, 93-109). However, the results of the Reconstruction
amendments, the Sixteenth Amendment (and the central government’s enhanced
revenue capacity that it confirmed) and the broad judicial interpretations of the com-
merce clause and other constitutional provisions have ensured the prominence of the
federal government, despite the strong sovereign guarantees that the United States
Constitution also provides, especially as reinforced by the Tenth Amendment.
Despite recent political rhetoric to the contrary, the role of the U.S. federal gov-
ernment in dictating economic, social, and political policies at the state and local
levels remains pervasive. Nonetheless, the federal system’s structure and the states’
formal sovereign authority remain firm, despite the federal government’s practical
dominance and its fiscal power to direct the policy agenda in many areas at both
sovereign levels of U.S. government. Political influence has become more centralized
within the United States, but much of the legal authority that implements it remains
the sovereign prerogative of state governments. The model of “marble cake” feder-
alism in which central and state authority and input become intertwined is a use-
ful theoretical approach for understanding this relationship (Volden, 2005: 327-342).
That institutional sovereignty of state governments is reinforced by state con-
stitutions that address a wide array of powers, including independent standards of
legal process and civil rights and liberties. Therefore, states often provide diverse
experimentations in many areas of public policy, including in terms of criminal law,
civil rights (including through state-level bills of rights that frequently provide
more stringent protections to citizens than the federal Bill of Rights offers), welfare
reform, regulatory oversight, and administrative process (McHugh, 2003: 3-17; Tarr,
1996: 3-23). Even as the economic and political authority of the country has become
more centralized throughout U.S. history, the federal system itself has remained
institutionally strong and salient.
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TWO PIVOTAL FEDERAL CHARACTERISTICS
AND THEIR LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
The status of a federal system can influence greatly the process of regional integra-
tion among different federal states. The sovereign subunits of a federal country can,
potentially, pose an impediment to that process. However, those same subunits can
exert an influence that can compel a need for greater cooperation and reflection that
can result in legal reforms more effective at the local level and more attuned to the
diverse needs of a varied and dynamic continent. Again, it is critical to evaluate these
three federal systems within the context of a meaningful definition and theory of
federalism as a governing principle. Only in that way can the effect of North Amer-
ican federalism be reasonably evaluated in terms of the continent’s future legal inte-
gration and harmonization, especially as that process extends beyond its NAFTA origins.
Two standards that emerge from this assessment and are fundamental to that theo-
retical evaluation involve normative and fairly relative concepts. The first of these
involves degrees of centralization and decentralization regarding the balance of actu-
al political and economic power between the central and subunit levels of govern-
ment.3 The second addresses the relative legal and constitutional strength of the
federal system, itself (Kisker, 1989: 35-52).
Therefore, from this perspective, a federal system can be categorized along two
different axes: degree of centralization and degree of institutional rigor. According
to those criteria, the three principal countries of North America are distinct from
each other. In terms of the centralization axis, Mexico is by far the most centralized,
followed by the United States, which is fairly centralized, and, then Canada, which
is relatively decentralized. The reasons for this contrast are rooted in the sovereign
relationship of each level to fundamental economic powers, especially control over
resources and revenue capacity. That status tends to be dictated by a political, rather
than constitutional, condition that has been called the political “golden rule”: “who-
ever has the gold, makes the rules.” This can be compared to the relationship among
sovereign states in international relations. A state can remain sovereign and retain sov-
ereign authority over its laws and policies and, yet, the superior strength of another
state (especially economically) can induce one to conform to the policy preferences
of the other (Thomson, 1995: 213-233).
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3 This characteristic has been central to the very concept of federalism, especially as distinct from unitary
regimes. It is not, however, merely the degree of decentralization of authority that is critical but the fact
that, within a federal system, decentralization is mandatory and not discretionary. This point is made
exceptionally well in Osaghae, 1990: 83-98.
The other axis is trickier to determine and designate. It is based on an assessment
that is arguably more subjective. In particular, the idea that a federal system lacks
“institutional rigor” can be refuted in terms of obvious constitutional provisions and
protections, provided that it does, indeed, truly qualify as a federal system, rather
than as a unitary systemwith administrative divisions of authority that are strong and,
in a practical –if not, technically, a sovereign– sense, permanent –the sort of institutional
assessment has been particularly relevant to critical evaluations of Nigerian federalism
(Olowu, 1991: 155-171). According to this axis, both Canada and the United States rate
fairly high in terms of institutional rigor while Mexico ranks much lower, perhaps
qualifying for a relative designation of institutionally “weak.” A critical assessment
of the constitutional status of the Mexican states does suggest certain institutional
weaknesses that may also have reinforced the trend of political centralization that
has been so prominent during Mexico’s history.
Nonetheless, “institutional rigor” and “centralization” are two distinct charac-
teristics of a federal system that have particular significance for the law, both inter-
nally and in terms of international cooperation and negotiation. The United States
can be characterized as a fairly “centralized” and strongly “institutionally rigorous”
federal system; Mexico can be characterized as a strongly “centralized” and a fairly
“institutionally non-rigorous” federal system; and Canada can be characterized as
a fairly “decentralized” and strongly “institutionally rigorous” federal system. The
overall consequence of these different characterizations of the three systems upon legal
integration and harmonization within North America can potentially be significant,
especially regarding the legal aspect of achieving greater institutional integration
and harmonization at the continental level. This potential influence of federalism
on international law has particularly been spurred by the development of the Euro-
pean Union, especially as a result of informal political influence, rather than as a
matter of formal-legal action (Bernier, 1973: 267-278).
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NORTH AMERICAN LEGAL HARMONIZATION
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
The principle of subsidiarity has guided the legal harmonization of Europe through-
out its development. It directs that the implementation of all policies and their
translation into law should be interpreted and applied in a manner that reconciles the
overarching desires for central harmonization with local autonomy and plural diver-
sity, which can be, ultimately, both a centralizing and decentralizing force (Duff,
1992: 29-30). A central lawwill be imposed only when the actions of individual states,
regions, or subunits are insufficient for achieving a legitimate community objective.
Furthermore, it encourages the interpretation of those central goals through values
and norms that reflect the communities they directly affect (Estella, 2005: 1-35). The
emphasis on the effect of policies on individual citizens and their particular per-
spective is a key goal of this adaptation. In that way, a closer union can be effected by
acknowledging and adapting to needs as expressed at a decentralized level (Hartley,
1993: 214-218). It addresses, therefore, the underlying concerns about shared sover-
eignty that have been a strong motivation for opposing greater European integration.
Subsidiarity has become a defining constitutional principle of the European Union
and has been cited as contributing to the process of legal integration and harmoniza-
tion that had previously been perceived as frustrating to achieve (Edwards, 1996: 38-79).
Germany offers a good example of the effect of federalism on legal subsidiarity. The
German länder have acquired increased influence and even constitutional authority
over the country’s European Union policy as a consequence of this principle. This
authority includes the necessity of obtaining the approval of the länder for future
delegation of German sovereign authority to the European Union (Baun, 1998: 329-
346). In fact, the länder have used this leverage in constitutional negotiations with the
German federal government, providing reinforcement to their sovereign position
within that country (Rogoff, 1999: 415-455). Given the emphasis of subsidiarity on the
legal norms and rules as they exist at the most local level, the evaluation of North
America’s federal systems based on their institutional rigor and degree of central-
ization is particularly pertinent. However, the success of the European approach in
this area does not necessarily provide a model for success in terms of North America,
especially given other differences between the two continents in this respect and the
uncertain future of North American cooperation in general (Duina, 2007: 63-100).
It can be argued that Canada’s federal system is best suited to take advantage
of a North American legal system based upon subsidiarity, especially as it has been
demonstrated within the model of the European Union. It has been noted that sub-
sidiarity relies on a process of sovereign cooperation within a system that is both
strong and flexible (Kohler, 1993: 613-615; Schaefer, 1991: 681-687). It could be argued
that the combined federal traits of institutional rigor and relative decentralization that
Canada possesses reflects those conditions very well. Thus these characteristics could
enhance the Canadian federal system’s capacity to take advantage of subsidiarity
as a legal principle in support of greater continental legal harmonization.
The more centralized federal systems of Mexico and the United States might
have greater difficulty in adapting to a principle of legal subsidiarity. Indeed, it has
been noted that the strongly centralized U.S. federal system could be regarded as
reflecting, if not the anti-thesis of subsidiarity, then, at least, a federal system that is
widely incompatible with this legal principle (Bermann, 1994: 403-447). The emphasis
on delegating increased responsibility (if not actual sovereignty) upon the Mexican
states (especially during the late 1990s), on the other hand, might indicate a future
willingness on the part ofMexico to bemore adaptive in this respect. For now, though,
subsidiarity does not seem to be especially compatible with the goal of greater con-
tinental harmonization in terms of the Mexican federal system.
NORTH AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND LEGAL INTEGRATION
The process of legal harmonization and integration in North America can pose dif-
ferent potential consequences and opportunities, depending on the characteristics
of that system within the respective federal systems. For Mexico, the strong central
government that also possesses sovereign authority over key areas of the country’s
economic and social system as a whole can impose a vision that has been negotiat-
ed between it and its continental partners. However, the practical result can be laws
that are difficult to apply, not only because they may be unpopular in certain parts
of the country, but also because they have not been instituted in a way that takes
into account the local conditions and other criteria that affect practical implemen-
tation. Continental legal integration could be more easily imposed but also could
result in ineffective or even counterproductive implementation.4
For the United States, practical centralization also makes it easier for the federal
government to negotiate and impose legal changes in support of regional integra-
tion. However, the more rigorous status of the federal system itself creates conditions
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4 Suggestions that this traditional condition of Mexican federalism could be changing as the result of admin-
istrative and political accommodations (particularly in relation to economic issues such as NAFTA) none-
theless have recognized that this change depends upon the central government’s willingness to “let go,”
given the institutional advantage of its sovereign position within the Mexican federal system, as acknowl-
edged in Ward and Rodriguez, 1999: 673-710.
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that permit the various states to intervene in the practical implementation and appli-
cation of this process of legal harmonization, especially at an institutional level.
That factor also would affect enforcement, which could be key to the ultimate effec-
tiveness of laws attempting to create a continental standard within important legal
areas, especially –but not exclusively– from a regulatory perspective. Furthermore,
that realization may help explain the initial lack of vigorous objections to NAFTA
among most U.S. state governments (Weiler, 1994: 113-133).
For Canada, the rigorously structured federal system, combined with the practical
decentralization that control over resources and other assets provide, seemingly would
make the process of legal harmonization and integration much more difficult to
achieve. Interestingly, though, the most economically dominant Canadian provinces
also are the ones that have generally been most supportive of NAFTA and continental
integration. The political and economic willingness of the governments of Ontario,
Quebec, and Alberta to engage in this process might facilitate, rather than frustrate,
this overall goal. That support has not been consistent, and its implications in terms
of federalism offer interesting insights into this overall theme (Abelson and Lusztig,
1996: 681-698). However, it also would require more substantial internal negotiations
between the central Canadian government and its provinces (a process of intergov-
ernmental federalism that has been increasingly developed during the past few
decades) in order to reach specific agreement in terms of many of these legal reforms
(Choudhry, 2002: 163-252).
CONCLUSION
Ultimately and, perhaps, counter-intuitively, federalism can enhance the process of
legal harmonization and integration, despite the fact that shared sovereignty might
appear to be a source of potential frustration in that respect. By compelling greater
internal debate over the precise vision of a continental union, a country with a strong,
decentralized federal constitutional order could engage in a more thorough and
thoughtful process of determining the precise needs and nature of a legal system
that transcends, yet accounts for, local and national conditions, values, and require-
ments. It is structurally more conducive to the introduction of a legal principle such
as subsidiarity, which has made German federalism a useful model for the process
of European confederation (Heuglin, 2000: 147-150). Meanwhile, a institutionally
less rigorous and more centralized federal system can be more easily and speedily
imposed, but those conditions also could lead to a legal integration that takes into
account a centralized vision, limited to dominant and perhaps less responsive inter-
nal forces, that is not conducive to accommodating the needs and desires of a local
population, perhaps exacerbating internal divisions within that country, especially
among differently situated subunits.5
Of the three North American federal systems, Canada might have the best model
for success in relation to future continental cooperation. Comparisons with the rel-
ative success of the German federal system and its relationship to the European
Union (especially in terms of the subsidiarity principle) provide potential insights.
However, the strong contrasts between the two continents must be taken into account.
In terms of North America, these partners are in “uncharted territory.” It is impos-
sible, therefore, to make specific predictions concerning the particular effect or course
of future legal negotiation and implementation. But the German example and the
nature of Canadian federalism in relation to theories of federalism suggest that a
strengthening of federal institutions and, perhaps, a trend toward decentralization
(perhaps through voluntarily loosening constraints and a greater willingness to in-
volve the sovereign subunits, especially within Mexico and the United States) could
potentially be helpful. However, that success will depend on other factors, includ-
ing political will. Those factors include the need for the respective governments to
restructure their institutions and political approaches in order to adapt to the poten-
tial future of a North American community (Pastor, 2001: 147-170).
Granted, a strong and decentralized federal system also could pose an obstacle
to efficient negotiation at the international level, especially when based on fearful
and parochial objections, rather than being open to a bolder and broader vision for the
future. Therefore, federal systems, such as the principal partners of a North Amer-
ican union, need to consider these potential difficulties and opportunities as they
engage in a process of developing and adapting legal norms and practices that will
harmonize and integrate the lawwithin the specific areas that will be most affected by
that process, especially in matters of law concerning trade, labor, commerce, intel-
lectual property, family relations, and the regulatory implementation of a broader,
more cooperative continental vision.
The fact that Mexico has a relatively highly centralized and institutionally weak
federal system may make it easier to negotiate future legal agreements with its con-
tinental neighbors. But it could also undermine practical implementation, especially
by ignoring the real difficulties of regional and local feelings of alienation. Meanwhile,
75
NORTH AMERICAN FEDERALISM
ESSAYS
5 It has been argued that the influence of “new federalism” policies and the revival of constitutional
jurisprudence relating to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution has provided
increasing scope for U.S. states to challenge the treaty-making authority of the U.S. federal government in
areas that impinge upon sovereign state authority, such as matters pertaining to criminal law and consular
protections of foreign residents (Swaine, 2003, 403-533). However, the actual potential of that sort of chal-
lenge has proven to be extremely limited.
the fact that Canada has a relatively decentralized and institutionally strong federal
system could make initial legal negotiation and institutional implementation more
difficult. But it could also enhance a sense of legal legitimacy for those arrangements
that could strengthen its practical effectiveness. Like Germany within the European
Union, that integration of federalism within this legal process could have a very
positive overall effect on the laws and institutions it produces. Again, therefore, the
presence of federalism could actually enhance the process of legal harmonization
and integration within North America, even though it also could pose certain insti-
tutional hurdles that would need to be negotiated along the way.
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